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Yoginder Sikand, An Islamic Critique of Patriarchy: Maulana Kalbe Sadiq’s Approach to Gender Relations in Islam
Reproduced with kind permission of, and thanks to, Qalandar and Yoginder Sikand. Perhaps because they form only a small minority, relatively little has been written about India’s Ithna Ashari or ‘Twelver’ Shia community. While some works on the history of the Indian Shias are available, contemporary Indian Shia voices are almost completely absent in writings on Muslims in present-day India. This is particularly unfortunate, given the rich scholarly tradition of the Indian Shias. Being a minority within a larger minority, Indian Shia voices often reflect concerns and articulate perspectives that are missing or else marginal in dominant Sunni discourse. The Lucknow-based Maulana Kalbe Sadiq is one of the leading and best-known present-day Indian Shia scholars. This article looks at his examination of the issue of gender in Islam, seeking to show how he handles and interprets the Islamic tradition in order to promote gender justice. It is based on an analysis of some of his majalis, lectures held during the month of Muharram to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Husain, delivered at various locations in India, Pakistan and North America. These majalis are hosted on various websites on the Internet. Sadiq’s basic purpose in addressing the question of gender in Islam is two-fold: to counter the claim that Islam is inherently misogynist, and, at the same time, to critique misogynist interpretations of Islam. He argues that Islam is God’s chosen religion for all humankind and for valid all times, and that no other way to salvation is possible. Hence, he believes, Islam provides women with position far superior to that in other religions. This claim he asserts both by discussing Islam’s teachings on gender relations and by comparing these with the teachings of other religions. Since most of his listeners are South Asians, he refers to the Hindu case with which they would be familiar in order to stress this claim. Thus, he argues, while a Hindu woman is expected to look upon her husband as her deity (pati parmeshvar), a Muslim wife enjoys a status equal to her husband. To consider him a deity would be a grave, unforgivable sin, for God is one and has no partners. In classical Hinduism, the practice of sati, the burning to death of a widow on the funeral pyre of her deceased husband, is prescribed for Hindu women, while Islam strongly encourages widows to remarry. Classical Hindu law provides no way out for a woman shackled in an unhappy wedding, while divorce is relatively simple in Islamic law. Likewise, Sadiq notes, classical Hindu law does not grant women any inheritance rights, in contrast to Islamic law. Hence, he suggests, those who argue that Islam denigrates women or robs them of their rights (and these include many Hindus as well) simply have their facts wrong. Sadiq’s Qur’anic Hermeneutics Sadiq’s understanding of gender equality and gender relations in Islam follows from what he sees as the basic underlying message of the Qur’an, and, indeed, of the mission of all the prophets that God has sent to humankind. He repeatedly quotes the Qur’an to suggest that God’s purpose in sending a long chain of messengers, with holy scriptures and revealed laws (shari’at), was to establish a just (‘adil) social order and to eliminate injustice and tyranny (zulm). Hence, he argues, any interpretation of Islam that goes against justice is itself un-Islamic. From this it follows that understandings of Islam that promote injustice towards women cannot said to faithfully represent God’s intentions, and hence must be revised or else rejected. Following from this, Sadiq makes a critical distinction between God’s Word, in the form of the Qur’an, on the one hand, and our diverse human understandings of it, on the other. He argues that human efforts to understand the true import of God’s revelation are always limited by the fact of us being human. God, the ‘Limitless’ (la-mahdud), he says, can hardly be fully understood by ‘limited’ (mahdud) beings. The fact of humans (other than the prophets and the ‘innocent’ Imams) as limited beings puts an insurmountable barrier to our gaining a complete understanding of God’s Will as contained in the Quran. This does not mean, however, that we cannot move in that direction, although Sadiq is quite clear that a perfect and total comprehension of God’s Will is impossible for ordinary humans. This is said to be clear proof that the Qur’an is God’s word, for, Sadiq says, while books written by ordinary mortals can be properly translated into other languages, the Qur’an cannot be faithfully represented in any other language because it is of divine origin. There can be, he says, no final translation (tarjuma) of the Qur’an, because translators, being humans after all, are limited by their humanness and their limited knowledge of the world through which they interpret the Qur’an. As he puts it, translation is static (jamid) while the Quran ‘moves along with time’ (zamana ke sath chalta hai). Hence, new meanings of the Qur’an can be uncovered over time as the stock of human knowledge expands. Sadiq’s case for a dynamic interpretation of the Qur’an, from which his own formulations on the gender question derive, rests on his willing acknowledgement that human knowledge is always in a state of development and progress. This, in turn, reflects on how we read and understand the Qur’an and the conclusions that we draw from it. The interpretation of the text is heavily influenced by the location and personal biography of the interpreter, Sadiq stresses. Although one must respect the ‘elders’ for their knowledge and their dedication to Islamic scholarship, he says, one must also recognise that their understanding of the Qur’an was indelibly influenced by the available human knowledge of their own times. None of the classical Qur’anic commentators (mufassirun), other than the twelve Imams, claimed infallibility (ismat), he says, and this explains why and how the Qur’an has been understood and interpreted in diverse ways by different scholars at different times. As time progresses and the corpus of human knowledge, both of the natural and the human sciences, expands, our understanding and interpretation of the holy text must also correspondingly widen, uncovering new meanings that were not accessible to past interpreters. Far from suggesting any inadequacy in the Qur’an itself, Sadiq argues that this itself provides conclusive proof of the Qur’an being God’s word, for in this way it proves its continuing relevance in every age. As regards the question of gender, therefore, this dynamic reading of the Qur’an allows for the possibility of new meanings to be read into the text with the passage of time, which, in turn, makes for new gender- just understandings of the divine mandate. Sadiq’s advocacy of a dynamic hermeneutics of the Quran naturally brings to the fore the question of taqlid, blind following of past jurisprudential precedent, and ijtihad, creative exercise of reason in understanding the sources of Islamic jurisprudence. This has a vital bearing on issues of jurisprudence involving women. Ithna Ashari Shi’ism has kept open the ‘doors of ijtihad’ (bab ul-ijtihad), by insisting on the need for taqlid on the part of ‘ordinary’ believers of a living mujtahid. Sadiq confesses that he is himself a muqallid, of Ayatollah Sayyed ‘Ali Seistani of Iraq, but argues that being a muqallid is far from being the same as a ‘blind follower’. He refuses, he says, to surrender his right to think for himself, and while he acknowledges that that he would act, in any particular matter, in accordance with the ijtihad of Ayatollah Seistani, he argues that has the right to put into practice the ijtihad of his mujtahid in the manner that he himself deems most appropriate, given the exigencies of particular social context. Critique of Misogynist So-Called Ahadith Sadiq’s gender just reading of the Qur’an critically engages with ‘traditionalist’ views about women in Islam. He suggests that while the Qur’an advocates gender justice, the corpus of Hadith, reports of sayings and deeds attributed to the Prophet, contains many statements that are clearly misogynist. He repeatedly stresses that he bases his arguments on the Qur’an alone. God, he says, has Himself announced in the Qur’an that He has taken on Himself the responsibility of preserving the Qur’an free from any error or change (tehrif). On the other hand, he says, God has made no such undertaking in the case of the Hadith. Sadiq recognises that it is largely from selective quotations from the corpus of Hadith that upholders of patriarchy have sought to develop ‘Islamic’ arguments to oppress and subordinate women. Hence, he devotes considerable attention to critically interrogating several misogynist so-called ahadith. This he does by pointing out that many so-called ahadith are pure fabrications, concocted well after the death of the Prophet and then wrongly attributed to him. This was done for a variety of causes, such as to promote certain political factions or to bolster patriarchy. A major source of misogyny in the corpus of Hadith is what is commonly known as israiliyat or israili rivayat. These are stories that trace their origins to early Jewish converts to Islam, who brought with them their own inherited misogynist attitudes, which some of them either attributed to the Prophet as so-called ahadith, or else disseminated as tales that later became an integral part of popular lore among many Muslim communities. Given this, Sadiq says, extreme caution is necessary when using the Hadith for advancing certain positions, and here he refers to both the Sunni and the Shia Hadith collections. Only those ahadith and reports (rivayat) must be accepted that are in accordance with the Qur’an. If they contradict the Qur’an they are to be discarded, and Sadiq argues that this is precisely what the Prophet and the Imams had themselves insisted. In his critique of patriarchal ahadith, Sadiq focuses particularly on the Sunni collection of Hadith, which differs in many respects from its Shia counterpart, although this does not mean that he uncritically accepts the corpus of Shia Hadith as fully authentic. In this way he appears to serve two purposes: firstly, to critique patriarchal interpretations of Islam by showing them to be based on concocted ahadith wrongly attributed to the Prophet; and secondly, to implicitly critique the Sunni tradition and offer the Shia understanding of Islam as both more ‘authentic’ and somehow more gender friendly. The latter he does in a subtle way while insisting that he has ‘full respect’ for Sunni scholars and the companions of the Prophet, stressing that he considers Sunnis to be his ‘brothers’, as fellow Muslims. One such so-called hadith often quoted by Sunni ‘ulama which Sadiq critically examines has it that the Prophet declared that a husband must seek the advice of his wife in any matter in which he has a doubt, and must do precisely the opposite of what his wife suggests. This so-called hadith has been used to denigrate women as intellectually deficient to men, and as unable to make sensible decisions. Sadiq insists that this story is fabricated and has no merit at all. To back his claim he refers to another hadith, according to which when, during the battle of Hudaibiyah, when his some of companions differed with him on his peace proposal, the Prophet sought the wife of his wife Umm Salama and did precisely what she advised him to. Sadiq cites a second so-called hadith regarded as ‘authoritative’ by many Sunnis, according to which, while on his nightly heavenly ascension (mi‘raj), the Prophet passed by hell and saw that it was full of women. This story has been taken by many Muslim scholars to suggest that women are somehow more prone to evil than men. Sadiq argues that it was impossible for the Prophet to ever make such a claim. As evidence, he cites a hadith according to which the Prophet said that if a man gives his daughter a good education and if she is virtuous and pious, she can stop the angels from dragging him to hell, with God’s leave. In other words, instead of being congenitally disposed to evil or evil in themselves, women, if pious, can actually save men from hell-fire. A second hadith that Sadiq uses to counter the above misogynist one has it that the Prophet declared that heaven lies at the feet of mothers. Sadiq further critiques this so-called hadith by reminding his listeners that in their supplications (durud) they beseech God for welfare (hasana) in this world and in the next, adding that a great source of hasana in this world is a pious wife (nek bivi). Hence, he says, the story of hell being full of women, which has been routinely used to subordinate women, cannot be said to be authentic. Sadiq is particularly critical of certain grossly misogynist so-called ahadith that are found in the Sahih of al-Bukhari, which many Sunnis consider to be the most reliable and authentic collection of Hadith. While questioning these so-called ahadith he is careful not to appear to hurt Sunni sentiments, adding that although the narrators of these traditions, like other companions of the Prophet, were not infallible, they ought to be respected. Sadiq critically interrogates some so-called hadith narrated by Abu Hurairah, and contained in al-Bukhari’s Sahih, to illustrate his argument that many false stories have been wrongly attributed to the Prophet in order to bolster patriarchy and subordinate women. Sadiq’s critique of Abu Huraira rests on the argument that although Abu Huraira had spent relatively very little time with the Prophet he later narrated an enormous number of traditions that he attributed to the Prophet. Many of these so-called ahadith were definitely fabricated. These include certain plainly misogynist traditions, which Sadiq explains as a result of Abu Huraira’s alleged ‘psychological allergy’ to women. Thus, Sadiq cites a story narrated by Abu Huraira claiming that the Prophet once said that if a dog, a donkey or a woman crosses in front of a man while he is praying, his prayer gets nullified. This was taken to suggest that a woman’s worth was the same as a donkey’s or a dog’s. Sadiq counters Abu Huraira’s story by arguing that when some Muslims complained to Ayesha, wife of the Prophet, about Abu Huraira’s statement, she said that the Prophet could never have uttered these words since she herself would often be lying down in front of the Prophet while he prayed and she would not move from that position for fear of disturbing him. Sadiq critiques another so-called hadith narrated by Abu Huraira, according to which the Prophet told his followers that three things were bad omens: a house, a horse and women. When Ayesha heard that Abu Huraira had circulated this story she remarked that he was not a good listener. She said that she was present when the Prophet was giving the discourse where he mentioned this, but added that the Prophet had actually said that the Jews, who think that the home, the horse and women are accursed, are wrong. However, she said, Abu Huraira entered the room when the Prophet was midway in this sentence, and so misunderstood what he had meant. Another so-called hadith found in Bukhari’s collection which Sadiq critically interrogates and then dismisses as false relates to the story of the creation of Adam and Eve. According to this story, God created Adam from mud, and then fashioned Eve from out of Adam’s rib. This is why, this so-called hadith claims the Prophet said, women will always remain ‘bent’. Hence, it is claimed, the Prophet declared that one should never try to ‘straighten’ a woman, for, being like a bent rib, she would inevitably ‘break’. This so-called ahadith is widely used to justify the argument that women are derived from, and hence biologically inferior to, men, and that they are also inherently ‘crooked’. Sadiq dismisses this story as a pure fabrication, asking how, if women are the ‘moulds’ (sancha) of their children, and if they are congenitally ‘bent’ or ‘crooked’, they can produce ‘proper’ male offspring. That this story has no Qur’anic sanction, Sadiq argues, is clearly evident from the fact that the word ‘rib’ is not used even once in the Qur’an. In this regard Sadiq refers to another popular story, according to which God first created Adam, and when Adam felt lonely He created Eve to keep him company. Sadiq says that this, story, too, completely contradicts the Qur’anic account of creation, where Adam and Eve are described as being produced simultaneously, and that too from the same substance and hence sharing the same essence. Similarly, Sadiq dismisses the theory, held by many Muslims, that Eve succumbed to Satan’s temptation and so was the cause of Adam’s expulsion from heaven. He says that this story is not found in the Qur’an, and is probably the result of a later influence of Christians with whom Muslims came into contact as Islam spread outside the Arabian peninsula following the death of the Prophet. By subjecting these and other so-called ahadith to a critical examination, Sadiq concludes that such misogynist stories and statements must not be accepted blindly, and nor should they be used to justify women’s subjugation in the name of Islam. Indeed, he seems to suggest, since they directly violate the Qur’an’s clear dictum of the fundamental equality of men and women, they must be treated as fabrications, and, therefore, should be firmly rejected. A Gender-Just Qur’anic Exegesis Sadiq’s critique of misogyny in an ‘Islamic’ garb goes along with an advocacy of an Islamic theology of gender equality. Islam, or, more properly, the Ithna Ashari Shia interpretation of Islam, offers ideal models of womanhood, Sadiq claims. The ideal Muslim woman, as expressed through these models, is far from being a passive creature confined to her home. Sadiq cites the instance of many women of the Ahl-i Bayt, the family of the Prophet whom the Shias hold in great reverence, who were great scholars themselves and also actively struggled against oppression and worked for the cause of Islam. Such, for instance, was Sayyeda Zainab, daughter of Imam ‘Ali, who participated in the battle of Karbala against the army of the tyrant Yazid, son of Mu‘awiyah. Another ideal woman was Hazrat Fatima, daughter of the Prophet, wife of Imam ‘Ali and mother of Sayyeda Zainab and the Imams Hasan and Husain. Hazrat Fatima was said to be so honorable in the eyes of the Prophet that the he would stand up whenever she entered into his presence, this being a privilege that she alone enjoyed. Sadiq also cites the examples of Mary, mother of Jesus, and Asiya, wife of the Pharoah, whom the Qur’an upholds for all Muslims, not just Muslim women alone, to emulate. Another sign of the great respect in which pious women are held in Islam, Sadiq says, is the annual haj pilgrimage, when the pilgrims run between the hills of Safa and Marwah to relive the plight of Hagar (Hajra) searching for water for her thirsty son Isma‘il. Sadiq’s sees the Qur’an as clearly and unambiguously mandating a project of comprehensive gender justice. This involves both highlighting the positive Qur’anic teachings in this regard as well as critically examining and dealing with those verses of the Qur’an that some commentators have used to uphold and bolster patriarchy. In developing a gender-just Qur’anic perspective, Sadiq points out that the Qur’an constantly refers to men and women as equal partners (zauj) of each other. It speaks of men and women being born of the same substance, and as fellow creatures of the one God, hence suggesting that, ontologically, they are not just equal but, in a very fundamental sense, identical, despite their physical differences. Sadiq argues that what most distinguishes humans from animals is the soul or spirit (ruh). The soul is the ‘basic reality’ (azal cheez) of human beings, while the body is simply a ‘garment’ for it. Now, the soul, he says, is neither male nor female. Hence, he argues, despite their biological differences, men and women have the same status (martaba). The Qur’an points to this, in, for instance, its story of the creation of humankind and its separate references to believing men and women where it relates the similar spiritual rewards they would receive in the afterlife. From this it follows, Sadiq asserts, that it is not one’s biology, but, rather, one’s character, piety, knowledge and actions (‘amal), that determine one’s status (fazilat) and make one inferior or superior to others. Neither of the genders can claim to be superior to the other as a whole. A man may be considered superior to a particular woman, not because of his gender, but, instead, because of his piety or knowledge. On the other hand, if a certain woman is more pious and knowledgeable than a particular man, she would be considered to be superior to him. In fact, Sadiq says, arguing against those who believe women to be intellectually inferior than men, God has given the capacity to reason (‘aql) equally to men and women. If girls are provided equal opportunities to study, he says with approval, they would even excel boys. Sadiq’s advocacy of gender equality is not a call for gender identity in terms of roles, for he argues that although men and women are equal, and in an ontological sense, the same, they are biologically prepared to engage in different tasks for the sake of a more harmonious family and society. There is nothing in the Qur’an, Sadiq says, that prohibits women from going out of the house or even working outside, under certain conditions. Yet, their most essential task, he says, is to maintain the home and look after the children. On them rests the onerous responsibility of rearing the new generation, for a mother is the ‘first school’ of her children. It is a mark of the great respect that Islam accords women, he says, that it has given her this responsibility on which depends the future of the entire community. A woman who is herself well educated, both in Islamic as well as modern disciplines, can perform this task in the most effective way. Hence the need for women’s religious and ‘secular’ education that Sadiq repeatedly stresses. In his discussion of the Qur’an, Sadiq directly addresses certain issues of jurisprudential import mentioned in the text that relate to women and that have often been used either to deny Muslim women their Islamic rights or else to argue that Islam is itself a misogynist religion. His discussion of these issues is geared both to critiquing misogynist interpretations of the Qur’an as well as to rebut the claims of the critics of Islam. One such issue is that of inheritance rights. Sadiq takes on critics of Islam who claim that the Qur’an legally sanctions women’s subordination by giving them inheritance rights half that of men. This claim, Sadiq says, is not true at all. For one thing, the Qur’an nowhere makes such a specification, and does not deal with men and women as two monolithic categories for matters of inheritance. While daughters do get half the share of their brothers in their deceased father’s property, this rule does not apply for other categories of heirs in all cases. Thus a deceased son’s parents inherit equally, a deceased man’s daughter’s son gets half the share of his son’s daughter, and his mother’s brother and sister get the same share. Arguing for the inherent justness of the Qur’anic rules of inheritance, Sadiq points out that while a woman would inherit half the share of her brother in the event of the death of their father, she would also receive a sum of money as mehr on marriage from her husband, the amount of which she can specify in the marriage contract. All gifts, other than articles meant solely for men’s use, given to the couple at the time of marriage also belong legally to the wife. The wife is not obliged to spend anything on running the household, even if she has an independent source of income of her own. All that she earns is hers, and the husband may not demand that she contribute to meeting the family’s expenses. The reason why a daughter inherits less than a son has nothing to do with any presumed inferiority of woman. Rather, Sadiq says, it is entirely just, given the fact that a woman’s financial needs must be provided for by males—by her father, or, in his absence, her elder brother, until her marriage, and, after that, by her husband. ‘A woman’s income is a hundred per cent saving, while a husband’s income is a hundred per cent expense’, Sadiq says, rounding off a discussion of what he regards as the Quran’s women-friendly rules of inheritance. Another contentious issue relates to women’s testimony (shahadat). Some Islamic scholars consider a woman’s testimony as half that of a man, based on a selective reading of a certain Qur’anic verse. Sadiq offers an alternate reading, suggesting that this verse must be seen in the particular historical context in which it was revealed, and stressing that it must not be arbitrarily transposed onto a different context to argue the case that women are somehow congenitally less intelligent than men, as some Muslim scholars indeed have done. That this provision was intended for only a particular context, and was not to be generalised for all women and for all times, is evident, Sadiq says, from the fact that any true Muslim would readily accept the evidence of a single woman, Hazrat Fatima, daughter of the Prophet, even if the entire population of the world were arraigned against her. With the help of this argument of contextuality, Sadiq is able to willingly approve of the current practice in Iran, for instance, where, he says, a third of the members of the country’s parliament are women, whose vote has the same value as that of male members. A third vexed issue is that of divorce (talaq). Sadiq’s discussion of divorce is geared to several purposes: to contrast the Shia position on the matter with the Sunni and thereby implicitly assert the superiority of the former over the latter; to critique and condemn widespread misuse of Sunni fiqh provisions related to talaq; and, to counter the argument that draws on talaq-related provisions in Sunni fiqh to claim that Islam is anti-women. He points out that the practice of ‘triple talaq’, according to which if a man pronounces the word ‘talaq’ three times in one sitting, even if in jest, anger or in a state of inebriety, his marriage is nullified, has led to widespread abuse and oppression of women. It has resulted in numerous hapless women being arbitrarily divorced by their husbands. In case the husband repents and wishes to regain his wife, his wife would have to marry someone else, consummate the marriage, obtain a divorce and then re-marry her first husband. This practise is known as hallala. This form of talaq is widely accepted by most Sunni ‘ulama in India. Sadiq argues that ‘triple talaq’ actually has no Qur’anic basis. He also declares that it is forbidden in the Ja‘fari mazhab, the school of law that the Ithna ‘Ashari Shias follow, where even if the word talaq is uttered thrice in one sitting it is considered simply as one talaq, not three. Sadiq offers to allow divorced Sunni couples who wish to save themselves the embarrassment of halala and desire to be reunited to resort to the Ja‘fari mazhab while still remaining Sunnis. In this way, he holds out the prospect of a more gender just law on divorce, works out a practical means for Sunni-Shia dialogue and, at the same time, presents an argument to indirectly put forward the claim of the Shia fiqh being more gender just than the Sunni. Another question that Sadiq addresses is the Qur’anic verse, in Surah al-Baqarah, which refers to God having given men an ‘edge’ over women. This verse has been used by many commentators to claim unrestricted male superiority over women in every matter or sphere. Sadiq vehemently disagrees, pointing out that this Qur’anic reference is clearly made in the context of divorce, and is not meant to apply in general terms. The ‘edge’ here is said to refer to the fact that a man can divorce his wife whenever he wants to, but in the absence of any conditions written into the marriage contract, a woman can have the marriage dissolved only by approaching the qazi, who, after being convinced that the husband has failed in his marital duties, can announce the marriage to be dissolved. Yet another vexed issue that Sadiq deals with in the course of his elaboration of the Qur’anic vision of gender relations is a verse in Surah al-Nisa that suggests that if a wife is disobedient, her husband can admonish her. If that does not work he can send her to her bed, and, finally, if this does not change her attitude, he can beat her. This does not mean, Sadiq says, that Islam gives husbands the unrestricted right to beat their wives, as some Muslim scholars as well as critics of Islam claim. A husband cannot beat his wife if she refuses to cook for him or clean the house, for instance, for she is not duty bound to do so. Sadiq says that the actual import of the word ‘beating’ (zarb) in this Qur’anic verse has been greatly debated and fiercely contested by various Islamic scholars. He claims that Imam Tabari, in his commentary on the Qur’an, devotes 27 pages to discussing the word, and says that over 200 meanings have been offered to explain it. Sadiq opines that it is wrong to equate zarb with beating, and adds that several ‘ulama who have done so have also laid down that a husband can beat a wife only with a toothbrush. This implies, he says, that there must be no seriousness in this sort of ‘beating’. Rather, it suggests a form of ‘love’ and ‘joking’, further stressing the fact that one is forbidden to actually beat one’s wife in a harmful way. In this regard, he reminds his listeners that the Prophet is the model for all Muslims to follow. The Prophet is not known to have ever beaten his wives, even if he was sometimes troubled by them. Likewise, none of the Imams of the Shias is said to have beaten their wives, although some of their wives even plotted against them. Hence, Sadiq says, Muslim men must follow their example and refrain from beating their wives. The Ideal Islamic Family An interesting feature of Sadiq’s gender discourse is its framing in terms of the rights (huquq) of women, particularly in their capacity as wives. Sadiq remarks that while it is true that women, like men, have their duties (zimmedariyan) as well, unfortunately ‘traditionalist’ scholars generally ignore women’s Islamic rights and focus, instead, on their responsibilities alone. This must, however, change, Sadiq stresses. In order to bring people to take their commitment to Islam seriously, he says, focus must first be given to their rights, after which one must stress their duties. To violate the natural rights that God has granted every human being, he argues, is a grave sin, an act of oppression (zulm) that God will not forgive unless the person whose rights have been trampled upon forgives the culprit. Women, like other creatures of God, have their own rights, and Sadiq insists that men must respect and uphold these if their commitment to Islam is to be acceptable to God. Bitterly critiquing patriarchal custom, Sadiq says that treating women as virtual servants of their husbands has no sanction whatsoever in Islam. This constitutes a fundamental violation of their God-given rights. A man cannot force a woman to meet his personal needs. He cannot insist that she was his clothes or cook food for him. She is not legally obliged to do so, and can refuse if she wants to. On the other hand, Sadiq says, a man, through his sincere love and respect for and loyalty to his wife, can cement such a close spiritual bond with her that they both willingly look after the personal needs of each other. However, this is not the fundamental objective of marriage in Islam, which, instead is, Sadiq says, to produce a future generation that would be, in spiritual, moral and intellectual terms, superior to the preceding one. For this, he stresses, both husband and wife have equally crucial roles to play. Being, to use a Qur’anic term, the zauj of each other, husband and wife are equals. Sadiq likens them to the two wheels of a vehicle that can only work if they are of the same size. ‘If one wheel is bigger than the other’, he says, ‘the vehicle cannot move’. Hence, for the ‘vehicle of life’ to be able to function, ‘both husband and wife must be considered to be equal’. Marriage, in Sadiq’s words, is a ‘major form of worship’. While the ritual prayers, fasting during the month of Ramzan, and the pilgrimage to Mecca are time-bound, marriage, Sadiq says, is a life-long form of worship, and so, in a certain sense, superior to ritual worship. Hence, he says, marriage should be treated with all the sanctity that it deserves. Relations between husband and wife must be that between two equals brought together through bonds of love and affection and respect for each other. Sadiq’s explorations of the Qur’anic vision of gender relations thus provide new avenues to both critique patriarchal traditions that are sought to be given an ‘Islamic’ gloss, as well as to press the claim for a gender-just understanding of the faith. This, in turn, has practical relevance in terms of both scriptural exegesis (tafsir) and jurisprudence (fiqh). Not surprisingly, Sadiq is an ardent advocate of women’s education, combining Islamic and the ‘secular’, seeing this as a fundamental Islamic duty as well a means to promote gender just readings of the Qur’an. He suggests that one of the major reasons why the patriarchal tradition that many scholars uphold has not been effectively challenged is because there have been so few women Islamic scholars. To address this he points to the need for more Muslim women to study Islam seriously. This is not to say that he goes as far as some would like him to in his espousal of women’s rights, for one can discern a distinctly apologetic and defensive tone underlying some of his claims. Critics could also point to his perhaps deliberate glossing over of certain patently patriarchal aspects of the Shia tradition, as, for instance, the practice of mut‘ah or temporary marriage. Likewise, in his fulsome praise of post-Revolution Iran he ignores the very real problems that many Iranian have to face precisely because of a certain narrow understanding of Shia Islam. Yet, on the whole, despite these obvious limitations, Sadiq’s elaborate reworking of the Islamic tradition does appear to offer new and refreshing perspectives through which to view the question of gender relations in Islam. Top | Back to Articles main | Yoginder Sikand Articles List |
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