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Dr Farish A. Noor, "Democracy and the universalism of Islam"
Column, 'The Other Malaysia', Malaysiakini.com, Dec 25, 2003. Reproduced with kind permission of, and thanks to, Malaysiakini.com Professor Nurcholish Madjid is one of the main Islamic intellectual figures in Indonesia. During the 1960s and 1970s he played a vital role in the Indonesian Islamic Students Association. During the 1980s he was one of the leading Indonesian scholars who helped to define the place of Islam in the political arena of Indonesia at a time when the regime of President Suharto was caught between the resurgent forces of political Islam and the anti-Islamist camps within the Indonesian military and political élite. Working as both an Islamic scholar and an activist, he established the Paramadina movement in 1986 which was directed towards dakwah [missionary] activities and the further inculcation of Islamic values and principles among professionals and intellectuals in the country. Today he is known as one of the foremost liberal Muslim thinkers of the region. Here he talks about democracy, social reform and political Islam in Indonesia. Farish: It is often said that the future of Islam lies in the East, where new schools of thought, social movements and political developments are taking place in the Muslim world. Many people look to countries in Asia and Southeast Asia in particular, and Indonesia is often cited as an example of 'progressive' Islam at work. What do you say to this? Nurcholish: It has often been said that Indonesia is the biggest Muslim country in the world. If we look at the figures on paper then we can say that this is true. After all, Indonesia's population is more than 220 million and 80 per cent of the people are practising Muslims. So we are undoubtedly the biggest Muslim nation in the world at present. But we cannot leave it at that alone. Figures and statistics do not tell us anything about how Islam is lived and experienced in any Muslim country. The numbers you see cannot give you an indication of the quality of lived Islam in Indonesia. There are many other discrepancies that the figures do not reflect. For instance, despite the overwhelmingly large number of Muslims in the country, Indonesia has one of the highest levels of corruption and abuse of power in the world. We have one of the highest levels of violence. For decades there was no freedom, no democracy in the country. Why? How? There is an obvious discrepancy here between appearance and reality. Indonesia may appear to be an Islamic country, but it has never been run and governed like one. What we need to do, therefore, is separate the statistics from the realities of Islam as it is actually lived and practised by Muslims themselves. Here I am not only talking about the long tradition of syncretism and accommodation that Indonesia and the Malay world is famous for, but also the glaring inconsistencies between our public acceptance of Islam as part of our identity and the fact that in so many ways we have failed to practise what Islam set out to preach. We also need to focus on the different spheres of Islamic activity, ranging from the beliefs of the poor masses to the abuse of Islam for political ends on the part of the powerful elite. That too constitutes part of the diversity of Islam in the contemporary Muslim world. Farish: It is odd that a country like Indonesia, which happens to be the biggest Muslim country in the world, has not been able to provide exemplary Muslim leadership. Why has this been the case? How did the governments of Sukarno and Suharto fail? Nurcholish: Now Sukarno was an example of a Muslim leader who never really understood what Islamic governance meant. It is true that in the 1930s he was regarded by some as a Muslim leader because of his close relationship with Omar Said Tjokroaminoto, founder of the Sarekat Islam. Sukarno was also said to have studied Islam while he was in exile on Flores, but this was at a time when he was reaching his political maturity and as such his understanding of Islam and modern politics remained limited because he himself was part of the traditional feudal Javanese political system. He internalised the values of feudalism as it was practised by the Javanese rulers of the past in his quest to become the Ratu Adil, or just ruler. So even after he came to power he never understood the notion of conflict of interest. He did not understand why it was wrong for him to give power, wealth and political connections to the people who were close to him like his relatives and his friends. Deep inside, he still believed that what he did was right; that what he was doing was to protect his family and friends the way a good father and friend would do under normal circumstances. But Sukarno never realised that the state was not a family business and that he could not run it that way. People kept telling him that he needed to change; the Muslims of Nahdlatul Ulama, Masyumi and Muhammadiyah begged him to govern in a more Islamic way. But Sukarno continued to live in his own world until he was toppled after the failed communist coup in 1965. During the Suharto era many of us in the Muslim movements and parties thought that things would change for the better, but we were disappointed. Many Islamic groups - like the Nahdlatul Ulama and its youth wing in particular - supported the army and Suharto because they thought that the rise of Suharto would mean an end to the communist threat and the rise of political Islam in the country. But Suharto kept to the path that Sukarno had created in many ways. He maintained the ban on the Masyumi party that Sukarno imposed. His close allies and generals like Ali Murtopo also worked hard to keep the Indonesian Muslims in their place. They made sure that Islam would never be able to rise again and that the Muslims' efforts to improve their economic and political conditions were obstructed. It was during the time of the Suharto government that the forces of political Islam were treated with the most suspicion and in many cases this even led to conflict, such as the troubles in Aceh. Suharto's decision to promote the more secular leaders of the army, many of whom were Chinese and Christian as well, only aggravated things further and made the relations between Muslims and Christians much worse during this time. Farish: Despite the failure of the political leadership in the country, Indonesia has performed amazingly well in other areas like social development. It is also important to note that Indonesia experienced the resurgence of Islam from the 1970s to the 1990s despite, or perhaps because of, the state's antagonistic stance towards Islam in general. Of late, the country seems to have developed an increasingly active political culture of its own, despite the restrictions during the Suharto era. How did this come about? Nurcholish: What you see in Indonesia today is the direct result of development that began in the 1960s. You see, in the 1960s Indonesia had its first generation of university and college graduates. When we were living under Dutch colonial rule there was no such thing as mass education on a national level, but after we achieved independence in 1945 one of the first things we did was to open universities and colleges all over the country. The children who started their schooling then began to graduate in the 1960s. Suddenly the country was full of university graduates. There were millions of them, and they were anxious, young and looking for jobs. When they entered the various fields and professions they were still young, in their 20s. They were beginning to have families. They bought their own homes. So they were busy with practical concerns and they could not get politically involved as yet. Then by the 1980s, the same people were much older, wiser and economically independent. They are now in their 40s and they are not as naive as before. They have a keener understanding of politics, and they know how and why the country is in the state that it is in now. By the 1980s these Indonesians were also becoming more conscious and aware of their Islamic identity. The process of Islamisation in Indonesia began at the same time as it took place in Malaysia. In both countries, a new generation of Muslims in their 40s began to call for changes in the way the country was governed. The Indonesian government under Suharto was forced to accept and to make the necessary changes. In the 1990s Suharto himself went on the hajj to Mecca and started to pray in public. These were cosmetic concessions that Suharto had to make to keep his popularity and credibility intact. But like Sukarno, Suharto made the same mistakes. He ruled in a feudal way, like a king, and the people resented him for it. In the end he was forced out of power in 1998. Farish: How will Indonesians react to these new changes? What kind of political order will be put into place now that Suharto is gone? This is an important question because in many ways the world is looking at Indonesia today for an example of how a predominantly Muslim society can make the transition from authoritarian rule to popular democracy. Nurcholish: We in Indonesia have never lived in a democracy. Although there were elections and such, there was never any real democracy under the Orde Baru [New Order] of Suharto. Now suddenly there are millions of people in the streets and they are told that they have democratic rights. Of course they do not know what to do. They have never been given a chance to make democratic demands before. This is true of many other Muslim societies today. In many parts of the Muslim world the people live under non-democratic systems. Muslims need to learn how to articulate their demands within a pluralist democratic space where one group needs to balance its demands with the needs of other groups and communities. But this is not going to be easy as they will have to adjust to new democratic practices with which they are not familiar and that have been denied to them for such a long time. Farish: What kind of Islam will emerge in Indonesia as a result of this upheaval? Do you foresee religious tensions emerging in the future or will it lead to compromises and cooperation between the various Islamic and non-Islamic groups and movements in your society? Nurcholish: Now what happens in the future is up to us. I have always said this to our people in Indonesia: 'If there is any hope for democracy in Indonesia, it lies with the Indonesian Muslims themselves.' I believe that the Indonesian Muslims want to work towards true democracy and freedom in the country. They want to see social justice, equity and fairness in all areas of governance, economics, the legal system and so on. But there are also groups that oppose the penetration of Islam into politics, secular movements that are anti-Muslim, and other Islamic movements that are militant in their approach. The presence of so many different competing groups makes the situation very difficult for us. Farish: If that be the case, then some might argue that the growing numbers of Islamist movements and so many different schools of thought can only complicate matters further. The sad fact is that in many cases we see today, diversity and pluralism in Muslim society is not something which is celebrated but rather becomes a cause of sectarian conflict and social strife instead. For a country like Indonesia which, as you have said, has hardly ever had the chance to develop as a pluralistic democracy, such diversity can be the cause of political crisis and instability. Nurcholish: Yes, there is the potential for crisis, but that has always been there. The danger now is that the changes have come too fast and are too much for the people to bear. For me the way out of such a crisis lies in emphasising the universalism of Islam, which is not only compatible with, but also works well within a democratic political system. Muslims need to remember that Islam is fundamentally universal in its outlook. This universalism lies at the heart of Islam as a religion and a system of values. The history and philosophy of Islam teaches us this as well. Here the figure of Nabi Ibrahim [Abraham] is important for us - Abraham is an example of the universal humanism that is inherent in Islam. He was neither a Jew nor a Christian, and certainly not a Muslim. But he is regarded as a prophet by all of us. Why? He is regarded as a Muslim prophet because he submitted to God. 'Islam' therefore means submission to God in the most universal sense. This submission to God is found at the heart of all religions. The universalism of Islam comes into being whenever there is this submission to God per se. We should not think of 'Islam' in terms of a name or label for a particular group of believers only. To be 'Muslim' should not be like belonging to a tribe or clan of some sort. Instead we should think of it as being of a certain spiritual disposition or state of mind; of a particular mode of Being. I suppose what I am saying here is that we need to seek a new vocabulary and mode of politics which is universal and yet allows us to maintain our specific group and collective identities, and sense of difference as well. For me, Islam provides Muslims with the resources to do that. But they need to utilise the discourse of Islam in such a way that it does not alienate other groupings. Farish: That sort of approach that you are speaking of is not all that popular these days. There are many Islamist movements that argue that Islam is more specific than that, and that Islam refers to only a particular religious system and a particular religious community. They would probably object to the sort of formulation that you are proposing on the grounds that it dilutes or obfuscates the specificity of Islam, which is precisely what they want to protect and project at the same time. While liberal Muslims intellectuals like yourself talk about the need to re-articulate a new reading of Islam that is universalist, open and accommodating, your opponents are talking about the need to reinforce the barriers between Islam and the Other, returning to a notion of a pure Islam that is essentialist and exclusivist. Nurcholish: I realise of course that some of this might sound controversial to those who are more narrow and dogmatic in their view. But the facts speak against them. As I pointed out with the example of Abraham, much of what we regard as Islamic does in fact predate Islam itself; yet it has been brought into the corpus of Islamic thought, civilisation and culture. This is because Islam has an accommodative character that we often overlook when we focus too much on ritual practice alone. But the fact is that Islam was and is able to accommodate differences - such as elements from the pre- Islamic past - because it is able to integrate Otherness within its register. Islam is not just ritual and politics - we must never forget the spiritual dimension, tasawwuf , that is so important in Islam. It is here, in the spiritual domain of Islam, that the universal message of the religion is most apparent. That is why I and others like me emphasise the need for a spiritual approach and understanding to the problems and dilemmas that we face today. And by 'spiritual' I do not mean to suggest something other-worldly or abstract beyond practicality. By this I mean a whole new way of looking at ourselves, our identity and our relationship with the Other, which is no longer predicated on simplistic notions of differences in terms of culture, rituals and practice. Farish: Where do you locate the Muslim intellectual in all this? Where do you place yourself and others like yourself in Indonesia today? There are many people in the world today who are looking at Indonesian scholars, activists and intellectuals like yourself and asking the question of what role you are playing in the socio-political dynamics of Indonesia. Nurcholish: We are not in an easy position at the moment in Indonesia. It has never been easy to be an intellectual in the country and it is even more difficult and complicated these days. At present the country is going in many different directions and there are so many new tendencies. Some of the new movements that have emerged are very militant, exclusivist and even violent. The intellectuals try their best to guide these movements and we try to guide the present leadership of the country, which is in the hands of Gus Dur (Abdurrahman Wahid) and the Nahdlatul Ulama-led coalition. So far Gus Dur has made his share of mistakes. He raised the salaries of civil servants and politicians, including himself, at a time when such a move went against the people's aspirations. Many fear that the traditional Javanese neo-feudal character of Gus Dur will get the better of him, in the same way that it did with Sukarno and Suharto. They are worried that he will turn the office of president into a patronage-machine to deal out concessions and favours to his close friends and political allies like his predecessors did. His [Gus Dur's] own role in trying to resolve the conflict in Aceh, the Moluccas and other parts of the country is also unclear. But he is still the best and only choice for us. We intellectuals need to guide him and keep him open to alternatives. There is no guarantee that it will succeed, but if he fails and falls then we all fall with him. The whole country might go down as well. But we cannot give up. This interview was conducted at a workshop on Muslim intellectual trends in 2000. It is part of a series of interviews published under the title 'New Voices of Islam'(Farish A. Noor, (ed.) ISIM institute, Leiden, Netherlands, 2002.) Dr FARISH A NOOR is a Malaysian political scientist and human rights activist. 'The Other Malaysia' tries to unearth aspects of Malaysia's history and culture that have been erased or relegated to the margins in order to remind us that there remains another Malaysia that is often forgotten. Also read: "Islam and the modern Muslim intellectual" Top | Back to Articles main | Dr. Noor Articles List |
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