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MANS, < Defendant, Appellee. y` dddy  APPEAL FROM THE BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT y` dddy Before Selya, Circuit Judge, Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, and Lynch, Circuit Judge. y` dddy Christopher J. Seufert with whom Seufert Professional Association was on brief for appellants. W. E. Whittington IV with whom Brooks McNally Whittington Platto & Vitt was on brief for appellee. < ____________________ October 13, 1998 ____________________    CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge. William and Norrine Field (the "Fields") appeal from a judgment of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit (the "BAP") allowing defendantappellee Philip W. Mans ("Mans") to discharge in bankruptcy a debt owed to the Fields. The debt in question arose from a personal guarantee by Mans of a note issued by his corporation and secured by a second mortgage on development property sold to him by the Fields. Events occurring after Mans's undisclosed sale of the mortgaged property to a third party led the Fields to charge that Mans had defrauded them into extending him credit. The Fields urge us to reverse the BAP's judgment and hold the debt nondischargeable.#x6X@ X@# For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the BAP's determination and affirm the most recent judgment of the bankruptcy court denying Mans a discharge. t)I. The facts have been set out in a number of previously published opinions, including the Supreme Court's opinion in FieldĠv. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995). SeeĠalso FieldĠv. Mans (In re Mans), 210 B.R. 1 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1997); Field v. Mans (In re Mans), 203 B.R. 355 (Bankr. D.N.H.#x6X@ X@# 1996); Field v. Mans (In re Mans),#x6X@ X@# 200 B.R. 293 (Bankr. D.N.H.#x6X@ X@# 1996). Because of this, our recitation below is limited to the essentials.#x6X@ X@# On June 23, 1987, the Fields sold development real estate (an inn) to a corporation wholly owned by Mans for $462,500. Mans's corporation paid $275,000 in cash and gave the Fields a promissory note for $187,500. The note, personally guaranteed by Mans, had a tenyear repayment period and was secured by a second mortgage on the real estate. Under the terms of the second mortgage deed, Mans, as mortgagor, covenanted and agreed not to convey the property to anyone else without the prior written consent of the mortgagees, the Fields. If Mans conveyed without their consent, the whole of the unpaid balance and interest of the mortgage and note became immediately due and payable, at the Fields' option#x6X@X@#. On October 8, 1987, Mans caused his corporation to transfer, without the Fields' knowledge or consent#x6X@X@#, the mortgaged real estate to a newly formed development partnership between himself and one DeFelice. The transfer was by deed executed on October 8, 1987, and recorded on October 19, 1987. In consideration, Mans received $447,500 in cash at the closing of the October 8 conveyance. At the time of this sale, Mans had made only four payments on the second mortgage held by the Fields. He still owed them approximately $180,000 in principal and $145,000 in future interest. The day following the October 8 sale, Mans's attorney " without revealing that the conveyance had already occurred " wrote to the Fields' lawyer requesting that the Fields consent to what appeared to be a stillunconsummated sale of the mortgaged real estate. This letter stated: ` ` ` Obviously, we do not want to trigger the dueonsale clause by reason of the transfer of the property into the development partnership. We ask that Mr. and Mrs. Field, as the holders of the second mortgage, consent in writing to the transfer of the property. ` ` ` We would appreciate your earliest response to this. We could avoid the issue entirely by simply putting the stock of [Mans's corporation] into the partnership instead of conveying title to the underlying real property, but for a variety of reasons it is preferable to convey the property. Ten days later, the Fields, through their attorney, replied that they would consent to sale of the real estate in return for $10,000 and the fulfillment of several other minor conditions. On October 27, Mans's attorney let the Fields know by letter that, although Mans would happily comply with the minor conditions, the Fields' request for $10,000 was "out of the question." Like its predecessor, the October 27 letter did not disclose that the proposed sale had already taken place. There the matter rested; discussions came to a close and the possibility of a sale was not mentioned again by either party. Sometime in 1988, William Field was informed by a business associate that there was a "new owner" of the property. Although the Fields visited the property often and talked with Mans about the development of the property, they did not request a title search nor did they ever ask Mans whether he had sold the property. The Fields spoke with an officer at Mascoma Savings Bank, the holder of the first mortgage on the property, who told them that he knew nothing about a transfer of the property. Even after the transfer, Mans continued to make regular payments to the Fields in accordance with the second mortgage.Real estate prices tumbled in the following years, and on December 10, 1990, Mans filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Hampshire. Around the same time, he stopped making payments to the Fields. At the time of the bankruptcy, Mans still owed the Fields $144,266. Eventually, the first mortgagee foreclosed, leaving nothing for the Fields. #x6X@X@# Three months after Mans filed for bankruptcy, the Fields learned about the October 1987 conveyance. The Fields filed a complaint in the bankruptcy proceeding alleging that Mans's personal obligation to them should not be discharged under 11 U.S.C.  523(a)(2)(A).X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:X@# (refusing to revisit an issue outside of the Supreme Court's remand for reconsideration in light of an intervening case); Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 555, 558 (D. Mass. 1995) (noting that, after a grant of summary judgment, a remand on one issue necessarily implied that none of the other issues before the court were determinative), rev'd on other grounds, 119 F.3d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1997),#x6X@?X@# the Supreme Court's mandate here did not contain any express or implied limitation. The Court issued a general remand order. See Field, 516 U.S. at 77 (ordering the case #x6X@@X@#remanded "for proceedings consistent with this opinion"). #x6X@AX@#In a footnote to its opinion, the Court stated that the extension of credit issue was not within the question on which it had granted certiorari. SeeĠid. at 63 n.2. A#x6X@BX@# court that refuses to address an issue on procedural grounds cannot reasonably be said to have decided the merits of that issue, even implicitly. Under these circumstances, then, we see no SupremeCourtmandated bar to consideration on remand of whether what occurred here amounted to an extension of credit nor of the related "causation" issues. We conclude that the question of law as to whether the events of this case could amount to an extension of credit obtained by fraud for purposes of 11 U.S.C.  523 is not foreclosed by the law of the case doctrine.#x6X@CX@# #Xx6X@DX@##x6X@EX@#Quick A.B.` ` ` Whether Mans's Fraud Caused the Fields to Grant an Extension of Credit.#Xx6X@FX@##x6X@GX@# #x6X@HX@#Section 523(a)(2)(A) disallows the discharge of an individual debtor from any debt "for . . . an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud." The BAP determined that Mans did not lose his discharge right under this section because the Fields' failure to accelerate, to the extent caused by fraud, was not an extension of credit within  523(a)(2)(A). The Fields now reply that their fraudinduced misapprehension that a sale had not yet occurred frustrated their option to have called the debt, causing them, in effect, to have extended credit involuntarily. #x6X@IX@#We review that argument de novo.#x6X@JX@#X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: